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Abstract. If we wish to compromise some password-protected system
as an attacker (i.e. a member of the red team), we have a large number
of popular and actively-maintained tools to choose from in helping us to
realise our goal. Password hash cracking hardware and software, online
guessing tools, exploit frameworks, and a wealth of tools for helping us
to perform reconnaissance on the target system are widely available. By
comparison, if we wish to defend a password-protected system against
such an attack (i.e. as a member of the blue team), we have compara-
tively few tools to choose from. In this research abstract, we present our
work to date on Passlab, a password security tool designed to help sys-
tem administrators take advantage of formal methods in order to make
sensible and evidence-based security decisions using a clean and intuitive
user interface.
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1 Introduction
When it comes to making decisions about the most appropriate password secu-
rity policy for a system, the tendency has traditionally been to take a “common
sense” approach. For example, it stands to reason intuitively that forcing a user
to include at least one number in their password will make that password harder
to guess and therefore more secure. Applying formal methods in order to quantify
this increase in security, however, is seldom part of the decision-making process,
leading to widely varying password security policies born from equally variable
intuitions about which factors contribute to their security. Previous work finds
that the password composition policy in place on a system has little to no cor-
relation with the value of the assets it protects [7]. We expect that tightening
legislation around data protection (in Europe in particular [4]) will encourage
industry to invest in tools that offer the ability to make data-driven password
security policy decisions.
The expected contribution is Passlab, an integrated environment that will
allow system administrators without a background in formal methods to make
informed password security decisions, formally reason about password composi-
tion policies and extract correct-by-construction software for enforcing them.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
07
20
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
1 M
ar 
20
20
2 S. Johnson
2 Literature Review
We draw on work exploring the distribution of passwords by Malone and Maher
[11] and Wang et al. [12] in order to derive equations such as that in Figure 1 (see
Section 3.1). The model of password composition policies presented by Blocki et
al. in [2] has shown promise thus far as a general low-level representation that
allows us to encode password composition policies for a wide variety of password
quality checking software. Work on attack-defence trees by Kordy et al. [9] offers
us a way to allow system administrators without a formal methods background
to model password guessing attacks and password composition policies to miti-
gate them in an intuitive and visual way. The Coq interactive theorem proving
software [1] and its code extraction capabilities [10] offer us a means to create
usable, formally-verified password composition policy enforcement software.
3 Progress to Date
In this section, we present progress to date on Passlab itself, and on work that
forms the foundations of the formal methods it employs.
3.1 Data-Informed Lockout Policies
A lockout policy is a restriction on the number of times a user can incorrectly
enter their password before their account is locked down, requiring additional
authentication via some other mechanism in order to reinstate their ability to
log in. This offers strong protection against so-called online password guessing
attacks (i.e. attacks against the live service) but in turn introduces a denial-of-
service vulnerability. If an attacker wants to prevent a user from accessing their
account, they need only attempt to access it with the wrong password enough
times that the lockout policy is triggered. This motivates us to search for formal
methods to derive the maximum number of incorrect login attempts we can
grant a user while guaranteeing that the probability of guessing attack success
is kept below a specified threshold in the worst case.
Figure 1 shows a render of the Passlab user interface as it fits a power-law
equation that maps the probability of a password being a correct guess (x) to its
rank (y) in a large password data dump (in this case, the RockYou data set [3]).
The software allows users to visually compose data analysis tasks such as that
illustrated in Figure 1. This draws on previous research, which finds that user-
chosen passwords tend to follow Zipf’s law in the general case [11,12]. That is,
the frequency (and therefore probability) of a password is inversely proportional
to its position in the data set, when ranked by frequency. In this case, it is
possible to use this equation to calculate that, even if an attacker knew the most
common 8 passwords on our system, if they selected an account at random and
tried these 8 passwords they would have a probability of successfully gaining
entry to that account of less than 0.02.
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Fig. 1. A mock-up of the Passlab user interface. A raw data source node loads a
raw password data dump (top left) which is then formatted (top centre) to convert it
to a CSV file. After formatting, the data enters a Zipf model node (bottom centre)
which computes a power-law equation to approximate guess success probability from
password guessing order (bottom right).
3.2 Interactive Security Policy Building
Fig. 2. An abstract exam-
ple of an attack-defence tree
(ADTree) [9] from which a
password composition policy
might be synthesised.
Passlab will include an “interactive security pol-
icy builder” from within which a system adminis-
trator can model a password guessing attack and
its mitigation measures as an attack-defence tree
(ADTree) [9] and synthesise password composi-
tion policy enforcement software (see Section 3.3).
Figure 2 shows how such an ADTree might look,
with policy-level mitigations for each mode em-
ployed by the password guessing attack in place.
The attacker has a goal of guessing a password
and, to try and achieve this, employs a bimodal
guessing attack—a dictionary attack using dictio-
nary D and a brute-force attack of passwords of
length up to 14. To mitigate this, we add defence
nodes to ensure that the password is not contained
in D and that its length is greater than 14.
After the system administrator builds a secu-
rity policy in this way, we would like them to be able to perform further rea-
soning from outside that environment. Work on this is ongoing in the form of
Skeptic, our Coq framework for reasoning about password composition policies
[8], which has already shown promise in formally verifying that certain password
composition policies confer immunity to certain attacks, for example. Creating
software that combines analysis of large data sets with formal verification for
usable security continues to be one of the main challenges in our research.
3.3 Correct-by-Construction Enforcement Software
We have previous work [6] on creating certified password composition policy
enforcement software, implemented from within the Coq proof assistant [1] and
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extracted to Haskell [10]. The extracted Haskell is then compiled into a pluggable
authentication module readily usable from a real Linux system. Building on
this work, we created Serenity [5], a DSL for building correct-by-construction
password quality checking software that employs formal verification to ensure
that password composition policies built using it are correct. A small user study
has provided encouraging preliminary results indicating that users find it easier
to express their desired password composition policy using the Serenity DSL
than they do using more traditional password composition policy enforcement
software.
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